Federalism and Supreme Court Review of Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to Unfortunate Impressions by Schlueter, David A
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship
1984
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of
Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to
Unfortunate Impressions
David A. Schlueter
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information,
please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Schlueter, Federalism and Supreme Court Review of Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to Unfortunate
Impressions, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 523 (1984).
ARTICLES
Federalism and Supreme Court Review
of Expansive State Court Decisions:
A Response to Unfortunate
Impressions
By DAVID A. SCHLUETER*
Introduction
In his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,1 Justice Ste-
vens criticized the Supreme Court for summarily disposing of the mer-
its of the case without the benefit of oral argument. Doing so, he said,
"creates the 'unfortunate impression that the Court is more interested
in upholding the power of the State than in vindicating individual
rights.'"2 A similar "unfortunate impression" appears with ever in-
creasing frequency as the Burger Court considers state appeals of state
court decisions that have expanded the protections of federal law. At
issue is the authority and the appropriateness of Supreme Court review
of such decisions. Critics argue that Supreme Court review of such
cases casts a chilling effect on aggressive state courts that forge new
protections of individual liberty.3 Thus, the argument continues, as a
more conservative Court refuses to extend federal civil liberties protec-
tions, it also disregards state autonomy and discourages state courts
* Associate Dean for Student Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, St.
Mary's Law School. B.A., 1969, Texas A&M University; J.D., 1971, Baylor University;
L.L.M., 1981, University of Virginia. Professor Schlueter served as a legal officer at the
United States Supreme Court from 1981 to 1983.
1. 434 U.S. 106, 117 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Id at 124 (quoting Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 103 (1977)).
3. See Welsh, Whose Federaism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of/State Civil Liber-
ties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1983); see also Collins, Plain Statements: The
Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A. J. 92 (1984); Collins, High Court Asserts Its
Authority, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 13, col. 1; Collins & Welsh, he Court vs. Rights, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 1983, § A, at 31, col. 5.
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from expanding their own state constitutional law to fill the gaps left by
the Court.
Some commentators appear dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's
repeated expression of respect for the autonomy of state courts4 and its
frequent reminders that state courts may provide more protection for
individual liberties under state law.5 When state courts ground their
expansive rulings on federal law, some would prefer that the Court ab-
dicate its prerogative to have the final say interpreting federal law, or at
least that the Court handle the case without discouraging state courts
from experimenting. 6
This Article does not focus primarily on the way in which the
Court has ruled upon individual liberties; it seems clear that in some
areas, such as criminal procedure, the present Court's record is mixed.7
Rather, the Article addresses the Burger Court's view of federalism: is
the Court actually reordering federal-state judicial relations at the ex-
pense of both state autonomy and individual liberties, especially the
rights of state criminal defendants? Or are its dispositions of expansive
state decisions giving the "unfortunate impression" that it is doing so?
Part I discusses the underlying authority of the Court to review
state court decisions and the self-imposed rule that the Court will not
review a state decision based on an independent and adequate state
ground. This section addresses the Court's disposition of state cases
where it is not clear whether an independent and adequate state ground
exists and briefly touches the wide range of other jurisdictional hurdles
that stand between a state court decision and plenary review by the
Supreme Court.
The focus of part II shifts to the momentum created by the Warren
Court's incorporation doctrine, which, coupled with recent Burger
Court rulings, has led to some expansive federal rulings from state
4. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475 (1983) (respect for independence
of state courts is a cornerstone in Court's refusal to decide state cases resting on independent
and adequate state grounds).
5. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 566-71 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726-29 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); O'Connor, Trends in the
Relationshp Between the Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of a State Court
Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801 (1981).
6. See generally Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Welsh, supra note 3.
7. See generally Saltzburg, Foreword- The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in the Warren andBurger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980) (Burger Court has reaf-
firmed nearly all of Warren Court criminal procedure decisions).
courts. Examined here are the problems those rulings present in our
federalist judicial system-where uniformity of federal law is desired
and the Supreme Court has the final word.
Finally, part III of the Article analyzes whether the Burger Court's
disposition of state cases indicates respect for state autonomy or creates
an unhealthy chill on state courts. In addressing that point, the Court's
recent decision in Michigan v. Long is offered as a sensible and worka-
ble rule for maintaining the balance between state autonomy and
Supreme Court supremacy. Whether the Burger Court's handling of
expansive state decisions adversely affects state criminal defendants is
also examined.
I. Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions
A. The Framework
Before examining the Burger Court's treatment of state court deci-
sions that have expanded the protections of federal law, it is important
to review briefly the Supreme Court's review powers over state court
decisions. The foundation is both constitutional and statutory. Article
III of the Constitution places the United States' final judicial authority
in the Supreme Court' and vests it with power to review cases "arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States."9 That sweeping
power is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which specifies the circumstances
under which the Court may review a state court decision, either
through certiorari or appeal.'0 In the former instance, the Court's grant
of plenary review is discretionary and is available whenever, inter alia,
"any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution. . . ." I The right to appeal is available under
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
10. The provision for reviewing federal cases is located in 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982),
which provides: Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be
invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, but such
appeal shall preclude review by writ of certiorari at the instance of such appellant, and the
review on appeal shall be restricted to the federal questions presented;
(3) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil
or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the
Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for
decision of the entire matter in controversy.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (3) (1982).
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more limited circumstances where the state court has struck down a
federal statute as being unconstitutional 2 or rejected a similar attack
on a state statute. 13 Although appeal is often considered to guarantee
mandatory plenary review, it does not. The Court may consider the
merits of the case but in most circumstances will summarily dismiss the
appeal for lack of a "substantial federal question" without receiving
briefs or hearing oral argument. 14
The current statutory provision draws no distinction between cases
in which a federal right has allegedly been denied by a state court and
those in which a state court has vindicated a federal right. Prior to
1914, however, a distinction existed. The Supreme Court's review pow-
ers over state courts extended only to those cases where a federal right
had been denied.15 Apparently, the change was triggered by a New
York case, Invest v. South Buffalo,16 which provided an expansive rul-
ing on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Congress re-
acted by extending Supreme Court review to cover state cases
sustaining a federal claim. 17 Thus, Congress provided the state itself
the opportunity to seek the Court's plenary review of a state court deci-
sion vindicating a federal right.'8
The constitutional and statutory framework for Supreme Court re-
view respects state autonomy. However, it also clearly and properly
balances state autonomy against the ultimate authority of the Supreme
Court in those state cases raising a federal issue. Thus our dual judicial
system of state and federal courts exists in a delicate balance often
characterized by a degree of tension and mistrust. 19
12. Id. at § 1257 (1).
13. Id. at § 1257 (2).
14. Some have suggested that a ruling on the substantiality of the appeal necessarily
involves weighing the merits of the case. See Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247
(1959); P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 649 (2d ed. 1973).
15. See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (1789). See also Dodd,
The United States Supreme Court as Final Interpreter of the Federal Constitution, 6 ILL L.
REV. 289 (1911).
16. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
17. The change is now reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). See generally F. FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 188-98 (1928).
18. It has only been in the last decade that the Court has reviewed state appeals of state
court decisions. When activist state courts have attempted to expand federal individual lib-
erties beyond a line drawn by a more conservative Supreme Court, a state has a good chance
of obtaining plenary review by the Court. See Justice Stevens' dissent in Michigan v. Long,
103 S. Ct. 3469, 3491 (1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
19. See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980).
The foregoing framework only presents broad guidance to the
Court as to what cases it may hear. Through the years, the Court has
devised a number of self-imposed templates for determining whether it
will exercise its jurisdiction. The Court has stated that it will not re-
view a state court decision that rests on independent and adequate state
grounds.2" Use of that self-imposed jurisdictional barrier has recently
stirred a great deal of debate and false impressions, particularly where
it is not clear whether the state court decision actually rested on such
grounds.
B. The Independent and Adequate State Ground Rule: Reviewing
Ambiguous State Court Decisions
Although the basis of the Supreme Court's independent and ade-
quate state ground rule (sometimes referred to as the "nonfederal"
ground rule) lies in Murdock v. City of Memphis,2 the most often
quoted statement of the Court's rule is from Herb v. Pitcairn:22
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the
principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest
on adequate and independent state grounds. The reason is so obvi-
ous that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is
found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction.
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our
power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected
its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion (citation omitted and emphasis
added).'
The self-imposed jurisdictional rule of declining jurisdiction where an
adequate state ground exists is easily understood, as is the rationale
behind it. Applying the rule, however, is no easy task because state
courts do not always spell out whether they relied on state grounds,
federal grounds, or both.
First, there is the problem of defining an "independent and ade-
quate state ground." The clearest case arises where the state court has
20. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3474-76; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
125 (1945).
21. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
22. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
23. Id. at 125-26.
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relied on its state constitution without any reference to federal law.24
In that instance the state ground will be viewed as both adequate and
independent. On the other hand, where the state court relies heavily on
federal principle and precedent and summarily cites its state constitu-
tion as sole or alternate grounds for its decision, the state grounds may
be adequate but not independent.2" The Court is particularly watchful
of arbitrary or contrived state procedural grounds that are invoked by
state courts to frustrate litigation of federal issues.26 The Court has also
noted that the mere fact that the state court might have relied on a state
ground will not be sufficient to bar jurisdiction.
Second, there is the problem of dealing with those cases where the
state court has either intertwined the state and federal grounds or sum-
marily stated that both the federal and state constitutions require the
result reached.2 The Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of those
ambiguous decisions has lead to some unfortunate impressions as to
the Supreme Court's motives.29 Those impressions stem in part from
the belief that whenever the Supreme Court reviews a state court deci-
sion, it intrudes, to some degree, upon state autonomy. That conclu-
sion is not a recent invention; it stems from the very tensions at work in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee3 ° when the Court first held that state court
decisions were subject to judicial review.
24. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3474 (state court relied almost exclusively
on federal law and only summarily cited what could have been adequate independent state
grounds).
26. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). See generally Sandalow, Henry v.
Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground. Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuP. CT.
REV. 187.
27. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967).
28. Where both state and federal grounds are intertwined, the Court must sort them and
determine whether the state ground is both independent of the federal ground and adequate,
standing alone, to support the state court's judgment. Several commentators have suggested
that where the state decision presents mixed grounds for its judgment, the Court should
grant review. See Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750,
760-61 (1972) (author suggests that where the state decisions are ambiguous the Court
should always grant reveiw); Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State
Ground.- Supreme Court Review and the Problem of Federalism, 13 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 737,
759 (1976) (author suggests that where grounds are mixed, Court could find no independent
and adequate state ground).
29. See generally Welsh, supra note 3. Professor Welsh concludes that the Court vacates
and remands state decisions with the hope of discouraging state courts from invoking state
law and thus blocking federal judicial review. See also infra notes 44-46 and accompanying
text.
30. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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Where the state court clearly rests its judgment solely on state law
grounds, such as its own constitution, the Supreme Court's action is
virtually automatic; it declines plenary review.31 When the state court
has not stated clearly what law is deciding the case-federal or state-
the Court has exercised several options. None of the options is, by the
Court's own admission, entirely without problems.32
1. Dismissing the Case
When the basis of a state court decision is not clear, the Supreme
Court's first option is to dismiss the case on the theory that where the
state court's reasoning is ambiguous, it is better to assume that an in-
dependent and adequate ground exists.33 This option respects state
courts because it does not intrude upon a state's affairs. It is clearly
consistent with the Court's careful allocation of its time and resources,
and there is no risk of rendering an advisory opinion.34
But there is a cost in dismissing state court decisions where the
court may have relied on federal law without an independent and ade-
quate state ground.35 When state courts can modify federal law at will
and insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review, uniformity in
federal law is threatened. This is not to suggest that the Court should
grant plenary review in all such cases. Rather, the point is that the
Court itself recognizes the risks of simply declining to review any am-
biguous state court decision.36
2. Deciding for Itself What the Law Is
Assuming the Court declines to dismiss the case, it may attempt to
decipher the state law and then decide whether the state court applied
it.37 This path also presents obvious problems. The Court recognizes
that state courts are in the best position to determine state law.3 Fur-
ther, the task of deciding that issue is time consuming for the Court.
31. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3476; Fox Film v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,
210 (1935).
32. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3474-75.
33. Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934).
34. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
35. See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). See also infra notes 40-41
and accompanying text.
36. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
37. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
38. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
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3. Asking the State Court for Clarification
The third option is probably the surest way of determining the
basis of the state court's judgment: asking the state court for clarifica-
tion. Clarification can take the form of either obtaining a certificate
from the state court 39 or vacating and remanding to the state court.
Although certification is rarely used, the vacate and remand procedure
has been used often. It is this procedure that has generated a great deal
of criticism of the Court. The underlying rationale for the vacate and
remand method was stated clearly by the Court in Minnesota v. Na-
tional Tea Co.:40
It is important that this Court not indulge in needless disserta-
tions on constitutional law. It is fundamental that state courts be
left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitu-
tions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure ad-
judications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a
determination by this Court of the validity under the federal con-
stitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate pow-
ers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and
ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then can we
ascertain whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be in-
voked. Only by that procedure can the responsibility for striking
down or upholding state legislation be fairly placed. For no
other course assures that important federal issues, such as have
been argued here, will reach this Court for adjudication; that
state courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues under
the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the
constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere techni-
cal rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the division of
authority between state courts and this Court and is of equal im-
portance to each. Only by such explicitness can the highest
courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their
respective jurisdictions.4 1
39. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). In this procedure the case is contin-
ued on the Court's docket pending a response from the state court. Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, justified this option on the ground that "it seems consistent with the respect
due the highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than told what they
have intended." Id at 127-28. This method, however, creates burdens for the state courts
and can cause problems. In Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 145 (1952), the Court continued
the case twice before finally vacating and remanding it when the state court advised that it
doubted it even had jurisdiction to provide clarification. See also Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wolfson & Kurland,
Ceritficates by State Courts of the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HARv. L. REv. 111
(1949).
40. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
41. Id. at 557.
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This statement sums up effectively the delicate balance between state
autonomy and federal supremacy. The vacate and remand rule is neu-
tral on its face; it favors neither interest.42
As some state courts seem increasingly willing to hand down ex-
pansive rulings,43 however, the need to decipher ambiguous decisions
has become a matter of concern. And as the Supreme Court has strug-
gled with those decisions before granting or denying plenary review,
some commentators have registered sharp criticism of the remand and
clarify option.
Their fundamental criticism is that by remanding the case to the
state court for clarification, the Supreme Court challenges the state
court to a "battle of wills" and tells the state court not to expand civil
liberties protections.' A remand also places the state courts in a posi-
tion of either toeing a more conservative federal line or risking political
retaliation at home.45 Some critics further contend that because on re-
mand state courts sometimes "clarify" their earlier decisions to rest on
federal grounds46-opening themselves for federal judicial review-the
Supreme Court is, in effect, intimidating state courts. These arguments
read a great deal of ill-will into the Court's dealings with state courts.
They also ignore, or disbelieve, the repeated reminders by both the lib-
eral and conservative members of the Court that the Court "respects"
state autonomy and the authority of state courts to expand state civil
liberties.47
A recent case cited by the critics to support their position is Mon-
tana v. Jackson.48 The Montana Supreme Court in its first decision
(Jackson 1) relied upon both federal and state constitutional law to
support its decision prohibiting a state prosecutor from offering into
evidence a motorist's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.49 The
state appealed. Shortly after deciding the same issue in South Dakota
42. Cf. Welsh, supra note 3, at 843-56.
43. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
44. See Welsh, supra note 3, at 819-23.
45. See infra note 150.
46. See Welsh, supra, note 3, at 847. Professor Welsh argues that statistics for the 1970-
1982 Terms show that in only 4 of 16 cases remanded for clarification did state courts re-
spond that their decisions rested exclusively on federal grounds. In the remainder the state
courts presumably relied on state grounds. If indeed the Court is relying upon a "battle of
wills" as Welsh suggests, the Court is not doing very well. The better conclusion would be
that the Court remanded those cases solely for the purpose of determining whether it had
jurisdiction, and not to tell the state courts how to decide their cases.
47. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
48. 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
49. State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981) (Jackson 1).
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v. Neville,5 ° the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Jackson I to the
state court for consideration of whether its decision rested on federal or
state grounds, and if on federal grounds, to reconsider it in light of
Neville.5 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Montana court's
decision was clearly based on state law because the court had repeat-
edly cited the Montana constitution.52
The number of times a state court cites its own state's law is not as
important as determining whether the state grounds are actually in-
dependent of federal law. In Jackson I, the Montana court had relied
on both federal and state law. The state's attorney general argued to the
Court that an earlier Montana decision indicated that the breadth of
the state law was dictated by the breadth of the Fifth Amendment as
delineated by the Court.53 Clearly, there was a genuine question as to
whether the state grounds in Jackson I were indeed independent.
On remand in Jackson )'L54 a newly constituted Montana Supreme
Court55 observed that the Jackson I opinion had indeed cited sections
of the state's constitution. The Jackson 11 court discussed the state case
law cited in that opinion and concluded:
In sum, we read the [first] Jackson opinion as based primarily on
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any reference to
the state constitution is not independent of the federal constitu-
tional decisions interpreting the Fifth Amendment. No reasons
are given nor an analysis made for extending our state constitu-
tional protections against self-incrimination beyond that afforded
by its federal counterpart.56
Applying the federal constitutional law of South Dakota v. Neville,57
the Montana court reversed its earlier decision and ruled that a motor-
ist's refusal to give a breathalyzer test could be introduced at trial. Two
justices who had been in the majority in Jackson I registered vehement
dissents. Justice Sheehy wrote:
Instead of knuckling under to this unjustified expansion of fed-
eral judicial power into the perimeters of our state power, we
50. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
51. Jackson 1, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
52. Id. at 1030-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977). See Welsh, supra note 3, at
849.
54. State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (1983).
55. Following Jackson I, one of the justices in the Jackson I majority, Justice Daly, was
replaced by Justice Gulbrandson. In Jackson II, he joined the three Jackson I dissenters to
form a new majority.
56. 672 P.2d 255, 258 (1983).
57. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
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should show our judicial displeasure by insisting that in Mon-
tana, this sovereign state can interpret its constitution to "guaran-
tee rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed by the
federal constitution.
58
The author of the majority opinion in Jackson I, Justice Shea, admit-
ted that he had underestimated the extent to which the Supreme Court
would intrude on a state court's prerogative to interpret its own consti-
tution.5 9 Justice Shea continued:
I suggest that the provisions of our own constitution do have
meaning independent of the interpretations given to the United
States Constitution, and that so long as we do not deny rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, we can and
should, where the situation arises, interpret our own constitution
to give more rights than those granted by the United States Con-
stitution. But the majority has abdicated that responsibility by
holding that provisions of our constitution "'substantially identi-
cal'" (whatever that means) with provisions of the United States
Constitution can get their meaning only from the United States
Supreme Court. It seems the majority has adopted the philoso-
phy suggested by Chief Justice Burger in Florida v. Casal, and
would permit the United States Supreme Court to tell us what
our state constitution means.6 °
Critics rally around these dissents as a prime example of the
Court's intent to thwart state courts' attempts to expand individual lib-
erties.6 ' Yet the dissenters also have misapprehended the meaning of
the Court's remand. The Court did not tell the Montana Supreme
Court, either expressly or impliedly, what its "state constitution
means." Instead, it asked the state court to clarify its first decision and
tell the Court whether it relied on federal or independent and adequate
state law. What the Montana Supreme Court did from that point on
was a matter solely within its discretion. Apparently, the Jackson 11
dissenters would rather have had the Supreme Court view the state
court's first decision as nonreviewable because the court had repeatedly
cited the state constitution.
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Jackson I was "expan-
sive" in that it extended the privilege against self-incrimination beyond
the federal constitutional line later drawn by the Supreme Court in
58. 672 P.2d at 260 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 262 (Shea, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 264-65. In Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3101-02 (1983), the Chief Justice reminded
the state that it could legislatively emasculate the exclusionary statute upon which the state
courts had relied.
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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South Dakota v. Neville.62 Thus, when faced with the first Jackson
opinion, the Court had several options. First, it could have viewed the
ambiguous state decision as resting on federal law and could have re-
versed and remanded in light of Neville. That course would have been
unnecessarily intrusive if the state court had not in fact rested its deci-
sion on federal grounds. Second, the Court could have denied plenary
review by treating it as a question of state law. But that option could
have insulated a possible expansion of federal law from Supreme Court
review, serving state autonomy at the expense of federal supremacy
and uniformity. The third option, and the one selected by the Court,
was the most appropriate under the circumstances. The Court re-
manded the case to the state court for clarification and possible recon-
sideration. Arguably, the Court demonstrated its respect for state
autonomy by permitting the Montana court to tell the Supreme Court
what grounds it relied upon.
The ultimate decision thus rested with the Montana court. The
Montana court could simply have said that its decision rested on state
grounds and that whatever federal law it had cited in its first decision
did not compel the result, but served only as other persuasive prece-
dent. 3 That ruling would have insulated an expansive ruling from fur-
ther Supreme Court review. Instead, the state court ruled that its
judgment would rest on federal law and applied the Court's ruling in
Neville.
Did the Supreme Court compel the result in Jackson II? Clearly
it did not. The decision resulted from a change in membership on the
Montana Supreme Court coupled with the shift of one member who
stated that in the first Jackson opinion he had not been concerned with
independent state grounds.64
62. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). The Court recognized that under Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), a driver suspected of driving while intoxicated could be forced to submit to
a blood-alcohol test. Therefore, because the state could compel him or her to submit, the
state could also give the driver the choice of either submitting to the test or having his or her
refusal used against him or her at trial.
63. In several cases where the state court's decision presented mixed grounds, the
Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction where the state court felt compelled by federal
constitutional law to interpret its state law as it did. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979). In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3476, the Court noted that the state
courts should distinguish between those cases where it feels compelled to follow federal law
and those cases where it finds federal law merely persuasive.
64. Justice Morrison had concurred with the majority in Jackson L In Jackson II, he
authored a special concurring opinion in which he joined the court only in the result. He
registered disagreement with the Supreme Court's reading of the Fifth Amendment in Nev-
ille but felt bound to follow it because the state and federal constitutional provisions were
identical.
It is important to note that the Court's remand in Jackson did not
result simply because the Montana court had provided an expansive
ruling; the ambiguous grounds for the state decision triggered it. Crit-
ics argue that the basis for the state court's Jackson I decision was
clear,65 but if there is any room for doubt it certainly seems reasonable
for the Court to seek clarification. Rather than choosing outright be-
tween state autonomy and federal supremacy, the Court provided the
state itself with the option of indicating beyond any doubt that its first
decision, although expansive, was not grounded in federal law.
Aside from ideological concerns over intruding upon state auton-
omy, the Court has been frustrated by the problem of deciding on an
ad hoc basis whether a state court has actually rested its judgment on
independent and adequate state grounds.6 The frustration is due in
part to the collision of state court decisions that challenge the Supreme
Court's view of federal law, and a conservative Court that holds the
line on civil liberties while simultaneously professing respect for state
autonomy.67 The problem is further compounded by a growing work-
load burden and a realization that the foregoing options dealing with
ambiguous state court decisions are inadequate. This frustration re-
cently led the Court to adopt a new "assumption" rule.
4. The Michigan v. Long 'ssumption" Rule
In Michigan v. Long,8 the Supreme Court addressed a decision by
the Michigan Supreme Court that relied primarily on federal law for
the proposition that Terry v. Ohio 9 did not permit a protective search
of a car's interior. The state court summarily noted that the Michigan
Constitution required the same result.7"
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of five Justices, noted the
foregoing methods of resolving ambiguous state decisions and the
shortcomings of each.7' No longer wishing to decide state law or to ask
the state courts to clarify their decisions, the Court set forth the new
procedure:
65. See Welsh, supra note 3, at 850.
66. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3475, where the Court noted that such an adhoc
approach is "antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of
federal-state relations are involved." Id.
67. See also infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
68. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
69. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. 413 Mich. 461, 471 n.4, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 n.4 (1982).
71. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3474-75.
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Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with
the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opin-
ion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to
rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all
other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain state-
ment in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being
used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves
compel the result that the court has reached. In this way, both
justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved. If
the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and in-
dependent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision.7 2
Justice O'Connor noted that this rule would eliminate both the Court's
need to examine state law73 and the danger of advisory opinions,74 and
would encourage state courts to develop state law without Supreme
Court intervention." After applying the new rule to the facts of the
case, the Court concluded that the Michigan Court had felt compelled
by its reading of federal constitutional law to construe state law in an
expansive manner; the proferred state grounds, 76 therefore, were not
independent.77 Turning to the merits, the Court extended Terry v.
Ohio78 to include a protective search of the passenger compartment of
an automobile.79
Justice Blackmun filed a brief concurring opinion in which he
agreed that the court had jurisdiction to review the case, but he could
not join in the adoption of a rule that, in his view, increased the danger
of issuing advisory opinions.80 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
72. Id at 3476.
73. Id The Court added in a footnote, however, that seeking clarification might be
desirable or necessary in certain circumstances. Id at n.6.
74. Id. at 3476. The danger of rendering an advisory opinion is one of two justifications
for not reviewing independent and adequate state grounds. See supra notes 22-23 and ac-
companying text. Apparently, the Court feels that if a state court follows the Michigan v.
Long rule and is clear about the basis of its decision, the Court will be able to decide
whether it should exercise jurisdiction without fear of guessing wrong and of the state court's
later stating that its decision did in fact rest on an independent and adequate state ground.
75. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
76. The Michigan Supreme Court cited its state constitution in two places in the opin-
ion. The greater portion of its support was gathered from Terry v. Ohio and its progeny.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3477-78.
78. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81.
80. Id at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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shall, dissented on the merits but expressed no views on the new "as-
sumption" rule; he simply agreed in a footnote that the Court had
jurisdiction.8'
In a dissent that focused exclusively on the new jurisdictional rule,
Justice Stevens challenged the rule as being unduly intrusive on state
autonomy. According to Justice Stevens, the Court should only review
those state cases in which a federal right has been denied 2 To do more
would be a misallocation of the Court's resources;8 3 just as the Court
has no business telling a court in Finland how to decide questions of
American law, so too the Court should refrain from telling the state
courts how to decide cases.84 In Justice Stevens' view, uniformity in
federal law is not a compelling reason for review of state court
decisions.8 5
Perhaps Michigan v. Long best demonstrates the practical
problems the Court faces in screening state cases and the frustrations
necessarily caused by ambiguous state decisions. As the Court has
used one device after another to gauge whether plenary review is ap-
propriate, it has repeatedly walked the thin line of balancing its respect
for state autonomy against the command of the Supremacy Clause.
Ambiguous state decisions tend to throw the balance off. The new
Michigan v. Long jurisdictional rule strikes a good balance.8 6 But it
nonetheless gives the impression to some critics that the Court is telling
state courts how to decide their cases.8 7 It is not. At most, the Court
runs the risk of erroneously concluding what ground-state or fed-
81. Id. at 3483 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting). That footnote in turn cited footnote 10 in
the majority opinion, which discussed why the Court felt it had jurisdiction over the case
regardless of the new assumption rule. To reach that conclusion, the majority applied Mich-
igan law.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id Justice Stevens noted the expanding number of cases in which the state appeals
a state court ruling. For further comments by Justice Stevens on the problems of allocating
the Court's resources, see Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177
(1982).
84. 103 S. Ct. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The comparison is not appropriate.
Where the state courts decide matters of federal law, the Supremacy Clause permits the
Supreme Court to state whether the state court's judgment was in accordance with the
United States Constitution. Indeed, it might be argued that the Supremacy Clause requires
the Supreme Court to rule on the matter.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3491. See infranotes 122-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on
the need for uniformity in federal law.
86. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court'r New Requirement, supra
note 3, at 92-94.
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eral-the state court actually used to decide the case. 8 But that risk
primarily concerns what state cases the Court should hear. It does not
tell the state courts how to resolve state law questions.
It should be noted that the existence of an independent and ade-
quate state ground presents only one of many jurisdictional barriers
facing the petitioner or appellant. He or she must also establish that
the state decision is a final valid judgment89 on a substantial federal
question ° from the state's highest court.' Furthermore, the Court will
measure the case against a long list of nonstatutory criteria that have
arisen through practice and tradition.9 =
It is indeed an "unfortunate impression" that the Supreme Court
prowls about looking for expansive state court decisions and stretches
its jurisdiction to snare them. Even a cursory review of state court deci-
sions that have been granted plenary review demonstrates that many
involved timely, important and nationwide issues as to which conflicts
existed among state courts or between state and federal courts. 93 That
trend will no doubt continue, even with the arrival of the Michigan v.
Long rule.
Nevertheless, the Court will continue to scrutinize expansive state
court rulings.
II. Expansive State Court Rulings and the Burger Court
Restraints
Although it is incorrect to assume that the Burger Court is set on
dismantling state court decisions that expand individual liberties, it is
clear that the Court will closely examine state court decisions which
rely on federal law to expand those liberties. It is now generally ac-
cepted that although the Supreme Court sets the minimum level of fed-
88. This type of risk is associated with advisory opinions. On remand the state court
can discount the Supreme Court's decision by stating that the court misinterpreted the state
court's first decision; e.g., the decision actually rested on independent and adequate state
grounds and should not have been reviewed by the Court.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAC-
TICE 208-30 (5th ed. 1978).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
92. Other justiciability hurdles include ripeness, standing, and mootness. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 62-71, 79-89 (1978).
93. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141 (1984). See generally R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 90, at 254-336. Supreme Court Rule 19.1(b) lists con-
flicts among jurisdictions as a reason for granting plenary review.
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eral protection of civil liberties, state courts are free to experiment 94
and increase protection under state law.95 It is less well known that the
Court in many respects also sets the ceiling on federal protections96 in
its efforts to maintain uniformity in federal law.97
Assuming the Burger Court is wary of activist state courts, the
question becomes whether it is so because it is a "conservative" court or
because it sees uniformity in federal law as a necessary goal. The short
answer is that it is probably for both reasons. The longer answer re-
quires a brief review of why the Court would even be criticized for
setting a federal ceiling and carefully scrutinizing expansive state court
decisions.
A. Warren Court Momentum: Incorporation and State Court
Response
Few would quarrel with the statement that in the past several de-
cades the single most dramatic development in federal-state relations
came from the Warren Court's "incorporation" cases. Of course, the
Warren Court was not the first to hold that particular provisions of the
Bill of Rights were applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.9" But it was during the Warren
Court era that virtually all of the Bill of Rights provisions were applied
to the states.99 The scope of the Court's selective incorporation was due
in part to the reluctance of state courts to broaden criminal procedure
rights of state defendants."°° Implicit in the incorporation cases was a
94. The states are often referred to as "laboratories" for determining new bounds for
individual rights. See McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2439 (1983) (Stevens, J., opin-
ion on denial of cert.); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972); Note, Of Laborato-
ries and Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533
(1976).
95. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
97. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
98. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927) (First Amendment rights); Chicago B & Q R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897) (just compensation for property taken by state).
99. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury in criminal case); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for witnesses); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation
of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
100. For example, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court declined to extend
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states so that the states would have an
adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the rule. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
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sense of mistrust for the state courts and the view that federal criminal
defendants were "better off"' than their state counterparts. 10 Because
state courts had almost always applied those rights more narrowly than
the Supreme Court, it was the appeal of the state defendant that was
heard. Ironically, as the Warren Court expanded and incorporated in-
dividual liberties, it "intruded" upon state autonomy, arguably show-
ing little respect in the process.
The initial state response was understandably hostile and defi-
ant.10 2 The Warren Court's posture was, in the view of some, an undue
expansion of federal power that chilled state experimentation with
criminal procedures. 03 Justice Harlan even suggested that imposition
of federal standards on states would ultimately dilute the federal stan-
dards themselves if the Court allowed leeway in state court application
of the standards."°4 Although the states have always been free to estab-
lish greater state law protections, 0 5 the Warren Court's expansive fed-
eral rulings tended to overtake whatever expansive state rulings might
have been forthcoming. Thus, there was little need for the Court to
hold back state courts eager to expand individual rights beyond the
federal limits set by the Supreme Court.
The state courts' initial defiance of Supreme Court intervention,
however, eventually cooled. Although some argue that state courts
eventually recognized the worth of the Warren Court's expansive deci-
sions, ' 6 the arrival of the more conservative Burger Court no doubt
helped sooth state court feelings.10 7
Ironically, as the Burger Court registered an intent to "hold the
line" on individual rights (especially in the area of criminal procedure)
134 (1954). When by 1961 only one-half of the states had adopted the rule, the Court made
it applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio at Large in 50 States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319.
101. See, e.g., C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.01, at 574 (1980) (Warren
Court seemed to act on the premise that state courts could not be counted on to vindicate
newly created federal rights); Project Report: Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 283 (1973).
102. See Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980"s: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 789, 791 (1981) (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota observes that the
state response was "hostile and defensive").
103. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
929, 953-56 (1965).
104. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
105. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
106. See Sheran, supra note 102, at 791.
107. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 905 (1976) (author observes that many state courts lean toward a more
conservative posture).
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a handful of state courts turned to their state law to adopt, or retain,
more protective standards. 0 8 The momentum for expanding individ-
ual rights that rested in the Supreme Court during the Warren era
shifted back to the states. A number of state courts have heeded the
advice of both commentators'0 9 and some Justices, 1 0 and have used
state law to re-extend rights limited by the Burger Court.
Several recent cases illustrate the point. In United States v. Ross'
and New York v. Belton," 2 the Supreme Court expanded police of-
ficers' authority to search vehicles. In Ross, the Court ruled that war-
rantless probable cause 'searches could extend to all portions of the
vehicle, including closed containers. In Belton, the Court ruled that
following an arrest, a warrantless search of the passenger compartment
was permitted. Those opinions, which narrowed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, were rejected by the Washington Supreme Court
in Ringer v. State."3 That court considered two consolidated cases in-
volving warrantless automobile searches. In each case the scenario was
the same: the defendant had been arrested and handcuffed after get-
ting out of his vehicle; the officers then conducted searches of the vehi-
cles and found contraband. The court noted that under federal law,
i.e., Ross and Belton, the searches would be valid. However, it relied on
state law to invalidate the searches. The opinion demonstrates the con-
temporary rationale of state court "momentum":
We perceive three stages in the prior development of the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The ex-
ception began as a narrow rule intended solely to protect against
108. Id at 874-75. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
109. See, e.g., Aldisert, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980"s: Comment, 22 WM. &
MARY L. Rnv. 821 (1981); Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981); Countryman, Why a State Bill offRihts? 45 WASH. L.
Rav. (1970); Falk, The State Constitutiorn A More Than 'Idequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Fleming & Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the
Old Misrmal Mist," 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 51 (1984); Force, State "Bill of Rights"- A Case of
Neglect and the Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REv. 125 (1969); Howard, State Courts
and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980);
Note, Stepping Into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather Than Federal
Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 339 (1978); Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate
State Ground- Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 737
(1976); Note, Rediscovering the Calfornia Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481
(1974).
110. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
111. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
112. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
113. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
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frustration of the arrest itself or the destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. [The Court subsequently, however,] with little or no
reasoned analysis, expanded the exception until it threatened to
swallow the general rule that a warrant is required. From [the
time] Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 367 (1964), was decided,
until 1981, when the Supreme Court decided New York v. Belton,
[citations omitted]. . . we neglected our own state constitution to
focus instead on protections provided by [the Fourth
Amendment].
We choose now to return to the protections of our own con-
stitution and to interpret them consistent with their common law
beginnings. To do so, however, [we must] overrule ... [other
state cases that] are inconsistent with this opinion.' 14
This independent path recently was followed by the same court in
State v. Chrisman,"5 where it ruled that an officer's warrantless entry
into the defendant's room (to accompany the defendant) could not jus-
tify a plain view seizure of contraband found in the room. The state
court rejected the Supreme Court's earlier decision in the same case' 6
which had permitted the seizure under the Fourth Amendment. But
the Washington Supreme Court did not reject the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment; it simply rested its more protective de-
cision on the Washington Constitution. 117
These are only two recent examples of expansive state court deci-
sions. Of course, by no means have a majority of state courts or state
judges chosen this path. For example, a plurality of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in Brown v. State"8 recently indicated that it would
follow the path cleared by the Supreme Court: until "statutorily or
constitutionally mandated to do otherwise," the plurality intended to
interpret the state constitution in harmony with the Supreme Court's
opinions."19 That view is probably shared by a majority of state
114. Id at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247. In addressing the probable cause search, the court
concluded that under state law, such a search could be justified only under exigent circum-
stances. Id at 702, 674 P.2d at 1248.
115. 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
116. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
117. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Dimmick stated that clear rules are not assured
when "we waffle between state and federal constitutions." 100 Wash. 2d at 864, 676 P.2d at
425.
118. 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
119. Id at 799. The Texas court was reconsidering a case reversed and remanded by the
Supreme Court. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). On remand the defense raised the
question of whether the court's first decision had rested on an independent and adequate
state ground. In response to the plurality's statement of allegiance to the Supreme Court's
rulings, one of the dissenters, Judge Teague, wrote: "To the plurality's implicit holding that
the members of this Court now have the role of being nothing more than mimicking court
jesters of the Supreme Court of the United States, taps should be blown, and flags flown at
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courts. 120
While many commentators applaud state court experiments to ex-
pand individual liberties, not all state courts are careful about how they
report which law they are using-federal or state. 12 1 To the extent that
they rely on state law, they clearly are not bound by Supreme Court
rulings. However, to the extent that they apply federal law in an ex-
pansive manner, they threaten uniformity in federal law and ultimately
risk Supreme Court review.
B. The Need for Uniformity in Federal Law: Applying the Federalism
Brakes
Our federalist system assumes that within their respective spheres,
the two judicial systems enjoy some autonomy.'22 Through largely
self-imposed judicial retraints, the Supreme Court respects state auton-
omy and declines to review state law questions. 23 The state courts,
however, are not limited to reviewing state law questions; in many
cases state courts resolve both state and federal questions. 124 Now that
half-mast--on behalf of what was formerly a court that was a part of the independent appel-
late judiciary of the State of Texas." 657 S.W. 2d at 810 (Teague, J., dissenting).
120. The reason for the allegiance was explained in part by the Oregon Supreme Court
in State v. Kennedy, 195 Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983) (footnote omitted): "This
court like others has high respect for the opinions of the Supreme Court, particularly when
they provide insight into the origins of provisions common to the state and federal bills of
rights rather than only a contemporary 'balance' of pragmatic considerations about which
reasonable people may differ over time and among the several states. It is therefore to be
expected that counsel and courts often will refer to federal decisions, or to commentary
based on such decisions, even in debating an undecided issue under state law." However,
the court warned that when it cites federal precedent in interpreting Oregon law, it does so
because it finds that precedent persuasive, not because it feels bound to do so.
See also Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants'Rights on State Rather Than
Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 340 (1978) (most state courts follow federal law
because of concern for "uniformity, simplicity and consistency of law enforcement, as well
as their deference to the Supreme Court").
121. For a good model of how a state court may forge more expansive state law and be
clear about what law is being used, see State v. Kennedy, 195 Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d 1316,
1321 (1983).
122. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (the state courts have concurrent pow-
ers with the federal courts unless they are prohibited). Professor Tribe states that the Consti-
tution "presumes the existence of states as lawmakers and governmental institutions distinct
from the federal government." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (1978).
123. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
124. Where both state and federal arguments have been raised, the suggestion has been
made that the state court should address and dispose of the state issue first, relieving the
court of opening itself to Supreme Court review on the federal question. See Massachusetts
v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Year-End Report of the
Judiciary 23 (1981) (Chief Justice Burger recommending this procedure); Carson, "Last
Things Last" .4 Methodological Approach to Legal,4rgumaent in State Courts, 19 WILLAM-
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state law has been "federalized" by the incorporation doctrine, 125 state
criminal decisions, for example, almost always present federal law is-
sues. 126 When state courts resolve those federal issues in a manner that
extends federal law beyond the limits set by the Supreme Court, the
Court will be careful to measure the state court rulings against the need
for uniformity in federal law.
The desire for a single set of federal standards is not new. It finds
its roots in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,127 where the Court addressed its
constitutional authority to exercise appellate review over state court
judgments. In discussing the motive for such authority, the Court
stated:
That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity
of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all sub-
jects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of equal
learning and integrity, in different states, might differently inter-
pret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the consti-
tution itself: if there were no revising authority to control these
jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uni-
formity, the laws, the treaties and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps,
never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or effi-
cacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend
such a state of things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be
believed that they could have escaped the enlightened convention
which formed the constitution. What, indeed, might then have
been only prophecy, has now become fact; and the appellate ju-
risdiction must continue to be the only adequate remedy for such
evils. 12
8
The Court explicitly recognized that it would have the final say in in-
terpreting federal law. In other words, a good argument can be made
that our federal system was not intended to be tripartite in nature, com-
prised of (1) federal law, (2) state law, and (3) federal law as finally
interpreted and applied by the state courts. Arguably, however, such a
system currently exists because in interpreting federal law, state courts
have some room for experimentation. 2 9 Because the Court does not
ETTE L.J. 641 (1983); Galie & Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme Court
Review- Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REv. 273 (1978) (urging
the Supreme Court to require states to address state issue first).
125. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
126. State defendants are usually well advised to raise and preserve the federal issues as
a possible vehicle for later collateral review in the federal courts. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
127. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
128. Id. at 347-48.
129. See supra note 94.
always grant plenary review to rule on these experiments, some state-
interpreted federal law exists.' 3° But this does not mean that state
courts are necessarily immune from Supreme Court review when they
decide federal issues.
The ieed for uniformity in federal law was recently echoed by
state court judges. At the 1982 Conference of Chief Justices, the par-
ticipants considered the advisability of legislation designed to reduce
federal court jurisdiction and permit state courts to have the final say
on controversial issues such as busing, prayer in schools, and abortion.
A unanimous resolution by those present expressed concern for such
proposals; the reason-lack of uniformity in federal law. The resolu-
tion stated in part:
C. State court litigation constantly presents new situations test-
ing the boundaries of federal constitutional rights. Without
the unifying function of United States Supreme Court re-
view, there inevitably will be divergence in state court deci-
sions, and thus the United States Constitution could mean
something different in each of the fifty states;
D. Confusion will exist as to whether and how federal acts will
be enforced in state courts and, if enforced, how states may
properly act against federal officers .. 131
The same reasoning would seem to apply with greater force to state
decisions affecting the federal criminal justice field, where a federal
crime may involve several states.
Not all agree that uniformity in federal law necessarily requires
Supreme Court review of expansive state court rulings. For example,
in his dissent in Michigan v. Long,132 Justice Stevens noted that he
would permit Supreme Court review only in those cases where a fed-
eral right had been denied133 Thus, if a state court vindicated a federal
right, no review would lie. Justice Stevens would apparently extend
130. In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3477 n.8, Justice O'Connor noted that the state
courts handle the bulk of the criminal cases and that because state courts are required to
apply federal constitutional standards, a "considerable body of federal law" is created.
Although the Court may permit some state-created federal law to stand, ultimately a
state court's position may provide one side of a conffict between state and federal courts and
provide the Court with the opportunity to address that position in a later case. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
131. Resolution I-Resolution Relating to Proposed Legislation to Restrict the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts (Jan. 30, 1982 meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S2242 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982). See gen-
erally Gressman & Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions of Exceptions to
Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 495 (1983).
132. 103 S. Ct. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text.
133. 103 S. Ct. at 3490-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that view even in cases where the state court provided greater protec-
tion than the Supreme Court would. Others share his view, arguing
that to review such state decisions is unduly intrusive and disrespectful
of state autonomy.'3 4 This argument ignores the fact that when a state
court vindicates a federal right, it may deny or limit other federal rights
or interests.' 35 Perhaps more importantly, without the possibility of
Supreme Court review serving as a check on runaway state court ex-
pansions of federal rights, the fears of the Supreme Court in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee 36 as well as those of the 1982 Conference of Chief Jus-
tices137 might be realized.
The desire for uniformity of federal law does not provide a license
for the Court to intrude unnecessarily upon state autonomy. No doubt
the Court itself realizes that point, but when a state court rules on fed-
eral law, the Supreme Court faces a potential jurisdictional question. It
must balance state autonomy and the Supremacy Clause.
Although the Court is not always consistent in screening state
court decisions, it does not treat state autonomy lightly. Nor does it
take lightly the need for uniformity in federal law. When a state
court's momentum has resulted in an expansive federal ruling, the
Supreme Court may intrude and apply the federalism brakes.
III. Burger Court Federalism: Lopsided?
The Burger Court's disposition of state court decisions, especially
those decisions affecting individual liberties, has been criticized. Some
of the criticism has been leveled at the Court's practice of vacating and
remanding a state court decision for purposes of obtaining clarifica-
tion. '3 Other critics assert that while principled federalism should en-
courage state courts to expand individual rights, the Burger Court has
adopted a "[1]opsided federalism . . . which demonstrates neither
repect for state court autonomy nor regard for individual rights."'
139
This section examines that two-fold criticism.
To better understand the present Court's posture concerning state
autonomy and protection of state defendants' rights, it is important to
note that while the Court may restrain some federal criminal proce-
134. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Welsh,
supra note 3, at 874.
135. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigatlio 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 605, 631-35 (1981).
136. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
139. See Collins & Welsh, The Court vs. Rights, supra note 3, § A, at 31, col. 6.
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dural rights, 41 it does not discourage state courts from expanding state
'criminal procedural rights.
The implicit mistrust of state courts, which was evident in the
Warren Court rulings on criminal procedure, seems to have temporar-
ily vanished. In its stead is the Burger Court's general deference to state
procedures and decisions. The Court's recent decisions involving fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state criminal trials141 and its application
of the Tenth 42 and Eleventh' 43 Amendments vividly demonstrate a re-
spect for state autonomy. That respect was again demonstrated in
Michigan v. Long'" in a majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor,
a former state appellate judge.
A. Showing Respect for State Autonomy: The Michigan v. Long
Balance
Whenever the Supreme Court grants plenary review in a state
case, the Court will to some degree "intrude" upon areas of state auton-
omy. 45 The issue then is not whether it did intrude, but whether the
intrusion was necessary. Where the state court has ventured to expand
federal law, the Court will be justified, in the interest of uniformity and
the Supremacy Clause, in granting plenary review. 146 Where it is not
clear whether the basis for the state court decision is state law or federal
law, the Court is justified in remanding the case to the state court for
clarification."4 That procedure in itself demonstrates respect for state
courts. The Court merely conveys to the state court that it has an inter-
est in the federal issues presented in the case. The state court has am-
ple opportunity to "insulate" its opinion from Supreme Court review
140. Even here the Burger Court's record is mixed. For example, the Court extended the
right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), but whittled away Fourth
Amendment protections. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (extended Terry
"stop and frisk" to passenger compartment of car); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
(abandoned rigid Aguilar-Spinelli test).
141. The Court has recently tightened the exhaustion requirements for state defendants
who seek collateral relief in federal courts. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
The underlying rationale is based upon federal-state comity. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
204-05 (1950).
142. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
143. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
144. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
145. Professor Wechsler has suggested that one of the major virtues of direct review is its
"marginal intrusion" upon state authority. In his view, "federal adjudication is confined to
cases where it is a bare necessity to maintain the effectiveness and uniformity of the federal
law." Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reylections on the Law and
the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1056 (1977).
146. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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by responding that its decision rests on independent and adequate state
grounds.
With the advent of the new Michigan v. Long "assumption" rule,
however, it should no longer be necessary to vacate and remand ambig-
uous state court judgments. Under the Long rule, the Court assumes
that a state decision appearing to rest primarily on federal grounds
does so, unless a clear statement to the contrary appears. This rule is
straightforward, easily applied, and-perhaps most importantly-
presents a reasonable balance between state autonomy and federal
supremacy. '48 The rule is not designed to serve as a means of "intru-
sion." Rather it presents the state courts with a clear and unmistakable
reminder of their autonomy and their ability to insulate expansive in-
terpretations of federal law from Supreme Court "intrusion." The op-
tion rests with the state courts.
The rule encourages experimentation. By reminding state courts
of their important role, the Supreme Court places the decision to exper-
iment in the hands of the state courts. 149 It is difficult to see, therefore,
how the rule might be viewed as either unduly intrusive or as having a
chilling effect on state courts. The Long rule does not instruct state
courts how to decide state law questions when a narrow federal law is
also applicable. If they wish to rely on more expansive state law
grounds, they may.
On its face, the Long rule places no new burdens on state courts
nor any new local political pressures. 50 Instead, it recognizes that
when there is a potential clash between state autonomy and the
148. See Schlueter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court Deci-
sions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079 (1984).
149. The Court in Michigan v. Longstated that the rule would "provide state judges with
a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference
. " 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
150. Professor Welsh has correctly suggested that local political pressures may constrain
state judges who might otherwise overcome a reluctance to question restrictive Supreme
Court decisions. Activist state courts open themselves to conservative groups in opposition
to expansion of rights. However, it is more difficult to agree with his suggestion that "the
'Burger Court's policy of reversing expansive state judgments plays into the hands of those
[opponents].'" Welsh, supra note 3, at 822. The implication is that the Court should not
review expansive state decisions for political reasons. The Supreme Court's concern is with
application and interpretation of federal law. The fact that its decisions might have political
impact on the local level does not justify abandoning its constitutional role. Assuming a
state court feels political pressure to follow a more conservative line, whether it attempts to
expand the "law" on federal or state grounds, should make no difference. If it expands state
law, it risks political pressure. If it expands federal law, it risks both political pressure and
Supreme Court reversal. Declining to review the latter case would not relieve the political
pressure.
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Supremacy Clause, the state courts may choose whether the Supreme
Court reviews their decisions and intrudes upon state autonomy.
B. Respect for State Autonomy: What About the State Defendant's
Rights?
The Burger Court respects the autonomy of state courts, as long as
expansive state court rulings do not threaten the uniformity of federal
law. Critics of this born-again respect for state autonomy fear unac-
ceptable costs to criminal defendants in state courts. They argue that
because the Burger Court is reducing some federal criminal procedural
protections, state criminal defendants will also be worse off. To some
extent this is true-but only if the state courts follow the federal path
established by the Supreme Court. States are free to strike an in-
dependent path and use state law to fill any gaps left by the Supreme
Court. Thus, it is likely that state defendants will be better off than
their federal counterparts in some cases.15 1
Critics combat this argument by asserting that the Supreme
Court's treatment of expansive state court decisions discourages state
courts from expanding defendants' rights. 152 They are only partially
correct, however. The Court's treatment of expansive state decisions
grounded on federal law is a justified signal to state courts that the
Court is the final arbiter of federal law. Absent a constitutional amend-
ment, it seems unlikely the Court will abdicate that role. Because the
Court declines to review state cases expanding state law, the Court's
decisions should not in themselves discourage state experimentation.
In other words, the solution to the critics' concerns involves educating
the state courts about their truly independent and sovereign power to
expand state civil liberties,"5 3 without limiting the Supreme Court's au-
thority to review state decisions. That is principled federalism.
State response to more limited Burger Court rulings need not be
reactionary1 54 or disrespectful. Those courts desiring to forge in-
dependent and expansive state law may refer to case law 55 and com-
151. See generally Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court:
Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalismr 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 221 (1983).
152. See Welsh, supra note 3, at 856; Collins & Welsh, The Court vs. Rights, supra note 3,
§ A, at 31, col. 6.
153. Considering the amount of commentary generated over the past decade and the
repeated reminders by the Court itself, it is safe to conclude that the educational process is
well under way.
154. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Awayfrom a Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981).
155. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 266 P.2d 1316 (1983).
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mentary1- 6 for guidance. Moreover, most state constitutions and
statutes have specific guarantees that provide excellent vehicles for
more expansive law. All the Supreme Court asks in Michigan v. Long
is that the state court clearly announce the legal basis for its decision.
Conclusion
The plain import of recent Supreme Court opinions points to sev-
eral observations about how the Court views state court decisions.
First, the present Court greatly respects state autonomy and the inde-
pendence of state courts. Second, the Supremacy Clause requires the
Court to serve as final arbiter of federal law to achieve uniformity in
federal law. This criterion may require reversal of a state court judg-
ment if the state court expanded federal law beyond a line drawn by
the Court. Finally, if it is not clear that the state court based its deci-
sion upon an independent and adequate state ground, it is not unduly
intrusive for the Supreme Court to either remand the case for clarifica-
tion or assume the absence of such a ground under Michigan v. Long.
None of the foregoing observations conflict with principled feder-
alism; instead, they represent a fine, delicate balance between state au-
tonomy and federal supremacy. That neither federal nor state liberties
are expanded does not necessarily mean that the Court favors a lop-
sided federalism. Nor is the balance upset when state courts choose to
follow more restrictive Supreme Court decisions rather than expanding
their own state law.
Recent criticism of the Court's handling of state court decisions
rests primarily on its disposition of Michigan v. Long and Montana v.
Jackson. Although each case was handled in a slightly different proce-
dural manner, both clearly demonstrate not only the Court's respect for
the independence of state courts but also its extreme frustration from
dealing with ambiguous state decisions. The fact that in each case the
state government was appealing an expansive state decision simply re-
flects a symptom of state court response to judicial restraint on the part
of the Burger Court. It thus highlights the Court's concern for deciding
correctly whether the state court relied on state law, federal law, or
both. More importantly, in neither case did the Court instruct the state
court how to rule.
To the extent that commentators view these cases as threats to
state court autonomy and as a symbol of lopsided Burger Court feder-
alism, they are responding only to "unfortunate impressions."
156. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
